China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era: a narrowing of discourse.

January saw the publication of the much-anticipated white paper on ‘China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era’. A new era – the coming of which may have passed many people by – that began in 2012 following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The ‘new era’ is significant as it represents the consolidation of President Xi Jinping’s political vision and its continued translation into domestic and foreign policy. The latest white paper shines a light on the Chinese government’s ambitions, and historical contributions, to global development. Whilst the publication has rightly been met, by academics and commentators, with a view that it offers nothing new and simply consolidates what is already known, the value of the paper may stem from what it tells us about the direction of global development discourse more broadly: of how China’s development cooperation is comparatively represented, defined, and enacted in the contemporary era.

It is true that the white paper brings together much of what is already known about Chinese development cooperation, including, its distribution, form, and character. The paper, in this sense, is useful for its validation of knowledge through the publication of text by the Chinese State Council directly. In content, for example, the paper reaffirms China’s self-identified role as the world’s largest developing country, the promotion of South-South Cooperation guided by the Five Principles of Coexistence, and a commitment to diverse forms of development assistance, including, loans, debt relief, complete projects, goods and materials, and people-to-people exchanges (to name just a few). The paper also continues an observed shift in narrative from ‘foreign aid’ to ‘international development cooperation’ that began with the formation of the new ‘China International Development Cooperation Agency’. However, as the Chinese government increasing acknowledges the interdependencies of its economic growth, it is the government’s contextualisation of its contributions, within the wider development landscape, that offers new insights.

It is important, therefore, to read the paper in the context of time and place. The lengthy space given over to a singular historical event, such as the Chinese government’s international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, is evidence of its temporality. It is suggested, in the document, that the paper is a response to a ‘call of the times’ (p. 3) and whilst this may refer to ongoing global challenges, it is also true that academics, policy makers, and international institutions have long requested greater clarity, transparency, and coordination with respect to China’s overseas development contributions. The paper, therefore, forms part of an effort by the government to explain and contextualise ‘the policies, funding and management of its development cooperation to the rest of the world’ (p.8).

China’s role in international development has often been represented in binary opposition to so-called ‘traditional’ actors from Europe and North America – actors associated with Washington-based institutions and think tanks such as the World Bank, United Nations, and International Monetary Fund – and their practices. This juxtaposition has been sustained not only by academics, policy makers, and commentators, but by the Chinese government itself who has sought to represent its development cooperation as qualitatively different from supposed ‘old and failing principles’ of traditional actors. Countering narratives of control and conditionalities, reference is often made to the ‘China Model’ or development ‘with Chinese Characteristics’. South-South Cooperation, promoted by the Chinese government, has formed part of this alternative discourse.

Whilst it is evident that the narrative of South-South Cooperation will remain a central focus in the ‘new era’, informed by the Five Principles of Coexistence, the paper makes clear that the Chinese government intends to support, and integrate further into, Washington-based institutions. The paper identified several projects and programmes, for example, that the Chinese government engages with and will continue to promote further, such as the UN 2030 Agenda. In reference to integrated economies, interdependencies, and shared prosperity, it is evident the Chinese government understands its sustained economic growth will be dependent upon balancing its self-interest with supporting global prosperity. Whereas China’s political and economic rise may have once been framed as a challenge to US-based institutions – and the founding of alternative forums, institutions, and agencies may represent this – the white paper indicates, for now, a support for, rather than rejection of, the current order.

Furthermore, rather than representing an alternative agenda, the language used within the white paper situates development back upon a single pathway within a linear narrative. Propagating a contested enlightenment perspective, the Chinese government seeks to share, with ‘needy countries’ (p.3), its own experience gained as it transitioned from ‘backwardness’ (p.4) to a modern and prosperous society. Whilst it is possible this language stems from an attempt, by the government, to translate its policies and practices into a Western discourse, this reductive language is problematic. The narrative of development with the paper, of what it is and how it is to be achieved, represents a challenge to the radical potential historically attributed to South-South Cooperation.

It is not the case, however, that the narrowing of discourse has been a one-way movement on behalf of a single set of actors. China’s increased political and economic agency has transformed the contemporary development landscape, providing many lessons for others, including, unashamed notions of self-interest and the role of trade and investment as a development mechanism. This was evident most recently, for example, in the United Kingdom’s merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and plans to reduce the aid budget from 0.7% of GDP to 0.5%. Therefore, as China’s seeks to consolidate its international and development cooperation, others are decentralising their agendas. This is not to say, however, that the Chinese government is abandoning its self-interest and support for trade and investment cooperation. Whilst not explicit in the paper, the significant role of the Belt and Road Initiative to coordinate projects that facilitate increased global trade capacity and improve connectivity suggests China’s commitment to FDI is not absent in the ‘new era’.

Whilst the white paper has sought to upgrade China’s international development cooperation to a distinct ‘model’ of international cooperation in the ‘new era’, it is possible to suggest that its publication represents the continued convergence of global development discourse more broadly.